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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Ohio Insurance: A Study in Legal Adroitness
INTRODUCTION
The usual clause found in accident and life insurance double in-
demnity policies insures against death or injury effected solely and
exclusively by external, violent, and accidental means.1 This article
will be limited to an examination of court interpretations of the
clause "accidental means," with particular reference to Ohio law.
The specific question to be answered is: will an injury that results
from a voluntary act of the insured be compensable under a policy
containing the above provision?
Insurance policies are construed the same as other forms of mer-
cantile contracts. 2 The words of the contract are given their normal
and ordinary meaning.3 In the event of ambiguity, the policy is con-
strued against the insurance company and in favor of the insured.'
These construction rules are simple enough in a vacuum, but when
they are applied to an individual claim, the results, as might be ex-
pected, are far from harmonious. The interpretation of the language
contained in insurance policies has long been a fruitful source of liti-
gation. The most prolific of the policy language interpretation cases
have been those involving the construction of the clause "accidental
means."
A court attempting to interpret the clause "accidental means"
may be confronted with any one of the following three fact situa-
tions:
1. The means (cause) which was responsible for insured's injury was
unintentional, as where the insured has slipped or fallen. Under
these facts no court -has denied recovery under the clause "acci-
dental means."
2. The means (cause) which occasioned insured's injury was intentional
and the result was likewise intentional, as where the insured has com-
mitted suicide. In this situation no court will allow recovery under
the clause "accidental means."
3. The means that gave rise to insured's injury was intentional, but the
result was unintended. To illustrate this, suppose the insured at-
tempts to repair his television set, but being unfamiliar with the set's
operation the insured places his wrench on the wrong bolt and
electrocutes himself.
Reduced to the essentials, the problem is whether there can be an ac-
cident, as contemplated by the clause "accidental means," where the
1. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942); Morgan v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 276 App. Div. 123, 99 N.E.2d 228 (1951).
2. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 43 Ohio App. 242, 183 N.E. 93 (1931).
3. Toms v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 146 Ohio St. 39, 63 N.E.2d 909 (1945); Bobier v. Na-
tional Cas. Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N.E.2d 798 (1944).
4. Gibbons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Ohio St. 481, 21 N.E.2d 588 (1939); Wash-
ington Fid. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Herbert, 49 Ohio App. 151, 195 N.E. 492 (1934).
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insured has intentionally done the act which caused his injury. In this
situation the courts are divided as to whether the injury was caused
by accidental means. One view interprets the clause "accidental
means" literally and allows recovery only where the means is acci-
dental (unintentional). The other view allows recovery where either
the means or the result is classified as accidental (unintentional).
Before discussing the Ohio law, a brief survey of the principal
cases under each view will be helpful in order to understand and ob-
jectively appraise the Ohio position.
VIEW THAT ALLOWS RECOVERY ONLY FOR ACCIDENTAL MEANS
An example of the reasoning under this view is found in the case
of Tuttle v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Company.5 There, the insured
contracted meningitis from snuffing a nasal douche too vigorously.
The court denied recovery on the basis that there was no accidental
means. The court reasoned that the insured did just what he intended
to do. The inhalation was no harder than the insured intended it to
be. Finding no accident in the cause (means), judgment was awarded
to the insurance company.
One of the leading cases under this strict view is Landress v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company.6 In this case, death was
caused by sunstroke while the insured was playing golf. The major-
ity concluded that under a policy insuring against death or injury by
accidental means there may be no recovery under these facts. Writ-
ing for the majority, Mr. Justice Stone stated:
But it is not enough, to establish liability under these clauses that the
death or injury was accidental in the understanding of the average
man... for here the carefully chosen words defining liability distinguish
between result and external means which produces it. The insurance is
not against accidental results.7
The court reasoned that the death may be accidental, but the means
(exposure to the sun) was not accidental. Therefore, a differentia-
tion is made between the results to the insured and the means which
is the operative cause in producing these results. This view was well
stated in the early Pledger8 case, where the court said, "accidental
death is an unintended and undesigned result arising from acts done;
death by accidental means is where the result arises from acts unin-
tentionally done."9  In other words, the distinction is between cause
and effect. This view precludes recovery for injuries caused by in-
sured's voluntary acts.
To mitigate the harshness of this view, many courts have liberal.
5. 58 Mont. 121, 190 Pac. 993 (1920).
6. 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
7. Id. at 495-96.
8. Pledger v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 197 S.W. 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
9. Id. at 890.
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ized their interpretation of the clause "accidental means" to permit
recovery where the result following the intentional act of the insured
is unforeseen, unintended, and unexpected. A typical statement of
the liberal view is:
Whether or not a means is accidental is determined by the character
of the effects. Accidental means are those which produce effects which
are not their natural and probable consequences. 10
These courts, while retaining the distinction, stress the result rather
than the means. This, it will be noticed, is the antithesis of the ra-
tionale employed in the strict approach. Many courts, in order to
preserve the old terminology, talk in terms of accidental means and
results, but actually stress ignorance of material circumstances on the
part of the insured. Such courts regard the injury as caused by acci-
dental means where the insured is unaware of material circumstances
which, if known to him prior to his act, would have caused him to act
differently." To qualify under this approach, however, the insured
must exercise ordinary care in doing the act.
Other courts, however, look to intention. When the result cannot
be reasonably anticipated, and is not intended by the actor, it will
be held a result produced by accidental means.' 2  The courts adopt-
ing this liberal approach often reach the same result as do the courts
that allow recovery for accidental result as well as for accidental
means.
VIEW THAT ALLOWS RECOVERY FOR EITHER ACCIDENTAL
MEANS OR FOR ACCIDENTAL RESULTS
The reasoning under this view is illustrated by the dissent of Mr.
Justice Cardozo in the Landress'3 case, wherein the decedent had suf-
fered a sunstroke while playing golf. The majority opinion was
previously cited as a bulwark for the strict view. The dissent posed
this syllogism:
If there was no accident in the means, there was none in the result,
for the two are inseparable. There was an accident throughout or there
was no accident at all.' 4
This metaphysical device was again used in Bukhata v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company."' There it was held that no accidental re-
sult can exist without accidental means, since, if all the means are in-
tentional, the result must be intentional. Other courts, prefering not
to deal in philosophy, apply the rule of strict construction against the
company on the theory that the distinction which divides the court is
10. Western Commercial Travelers Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898).
11. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942).
12. Konschak v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 186 Minn. 423, 243 N.W. 691 (1932).
13. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 493 (1934) (dissent).
14. Id. at 501 (dissent).
15. 145 Kan. 858, 67 P.2d 607 (1937).
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not known by the average man,16 that the clause, "accidental means,"
is ambiguous, 17 or that the courts should not lend a hand to companies
attempting to escape liability through legal adroitness.1 ' The re-
maining courts adopting this view use a combination of the rationale
mentioned above, or merely find it more convenient not to make any
distinction because of the resulting confusion. 9 There are, of course,
many other public policy arguments that have been advanced by
writers and courts, but they add nothing to what has already been
stated .2  The underlying idea of each seems to be that it is more
equitable to grant relief than to deny it.
Thus, in those situations where the injury is occasioned by the
voluntary act of the insured, these views exist:
1. The view which allows recovery only when the means are accidental.
2. The view which recognizes a distinction but has liberalized the term
accidental means to accomplish more equitable results.
3. The view that allows recovery where either the means or the result is
accidental.
THE OHIO POSITION
The precedent setting case in Ohio is New Amsterdam Casualty
Company v. Johnson.2' Here, the insured had taken a cold bath to
cool himself after horseback riding. The cold bath caused a dilation
of the heart which resulted in the death of the insured. The policy
insured against death via "accidental means." It was conceded at
the trial that insured had no organic trouble with his heart. In de-
nying recovery, the court said: "heart dilation following the taking
of such bath when heated is a natural result from a natural cause."
22
Counsel for the plaintiff had argued that the result was unusual and
unexpected, but the court answered:
Undoubtedly an accident, in both its technical and commonly accepted
meaning is an event which occurs without one's foresight or expectation
and wholly undesigned, yet it is not true that every unusual, unforeseen
and unexpected event is an accident within the true meaning of the term
as used in insurance policies 3
Since the insured was not pushed nor did he slip into the tub, but
rather entered voluntarily, there was no accident and what followed
was a natural consequence of a natural act. Other than the result of
heart dilation, nothing occurred that was not intended by the insured.
To further buttress its position, the court added the rather dubious
16. Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946).
17. Travelers Protective Ass'n v. Stephens, 185 Ark. 600, 49 S.W.2d 364 (1932); Taylor v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929).
18. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942).
19. Ibid.
20. Annor., 166 A.L.R. 469 (1947).
21. 91 Ohio S. 155, 110 N.E. 475 (1914).
22. Id. at 157, 110 N.E. at 475.
23. Id. at 158, 110 N.E. at 476.
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statement that had this case been submitted to the average business-
man, he would have been "shocked" had recovery been allowed on a
policy insuring against death by accidental means.
The next case decided by the supreme court dealing directly with
an "accidental means" clause was Mitchell v. New York Life Insur-
ance Company. 4 Suit was under a double indemnity provision which
provided for increased indemnity if death resulted from bodily in-
jury, effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means.
Insured died as the result of a ruptured sigmoid caused by a self-ad-
ministered enema, using a tube connected directly to the faucets in a
nearby bathtub. The court denied recovery, stating: ". . . the 'means'
which produced the injury and consequent death of decedent was vol-
untarily and intentionally employed and in the manner intended. ' 25
The argument was made that the rupture was caused by an increase
in the water pressure, but the court observed that there was no evi-
dence that this alleged increase was not caused by insured's manipu-
lation of the faucet controls. It was indicated that had the pressure
increased unexpectedly as a result of some condition outside insured's
control, the decision might have been different.
Beginning a campaign to introduce the liberal view into Ohio law,
Judge Hart dissented. He said:
The confusion of thought on this subject arises .. .in the failure to
differentiate or to recognize the distinction between the origin of injury
flowing from the voluntary act of the party injured accompanied with
full knowledge and apprehension of the probable consequences of his
act and the origin of injury flowing from the voluntary act of the party
injured, unaccompanied by apprehension on his part of unforeseen and
unexpected consequences resulting from such act. In the latter case, the
event or circumstance which he failed to apprehend and which were re-
sponsible for the mishap furnishes the basis of accident by accidental
means.
26
The result clearly was not intended nor expected, so it must have
been occasioned by insured's misjudgment of his ability to control
the water pressure. The misjudgment was the means and this was
accidental; therefore, such injury was caused by accidental means.
This dissent takes the "ignorant of material circumstances approach"
mentioned earlier in the discussion of the liberal view.
The supreme court reiterated its view in Hassay v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company.17 The court approved these charges, which
reflect the strict view:
If John Hassay voluntarily and intentionally employed the means
which produced his death then there can be no recovery under this
policy.28
24. 136 Ohio St. 551, 27 N.E.2d 243 (1940).
25. Id. at 555, 27 N.E.2d at 245.
26. Id. at 556, 27 N.E.2d at 245 (dissent).
27. 140 Ohio St. 266, 43 N.E.2d 229 (1942).
28. Id. at 271, 43 N.E.2d at 231.
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A means is not accidental within the terms of the policy... because
some unexpected result followed in addition to that which was intended
to be accomplished.2 9
Once again Judge Hart, urging the liberal view, dissented. He
stated that unless the death was the natural and probable result of in-
sured's act, his death resulted from accidental means within the terms
of the policy. If something unforeseen, unexpected, and unusual pre-
ceeds the injury, it is injury by accidental means.30
In Burns v. Employers' Liability Assurance Company3' the su-
preme court would not let a chance pass by without expounding on its
interpretation of the clause "accidental means." In that case death
resulted from amebic dysentery caused by drinking infected water
from a tap in a hotel room. The water had become infected by the
breaking of a sewer pipe. The court, in pure dictum, lectured for
pages on its theory of accidental means but then decided the case on
the question of bodily injury. The court held that a disease such as
amebic dysentery was not bodily injury as contemplated in the insur-
ance contract.
There are several important Ohio appellate cases in this area of
the law. In Blubough v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company,3 2
insured received a hernia from moving an oil drum. The court rea-
soned that since the moving was voluntary and intentional, in order
for the insured to recover there must be shown an accident in the
means, i.e., some slip or fall while in the act of moving the drum.
Since there was no such evidence, no recovery was allowed.
In Groves v. World Insurance Company3 3 the policy insured
against accidental bodily injury. The insured was allegedly injured
as a result of a strain caused by moving a refrigerator. This neces-
sitated an operation, and shortly thereafter the insured died. The
court decided there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the
operation was the cause of the death. The alternative ground ad-
vanced by the plaintiff was that moving the refrigerator constituted
an accidental bodily injury. The court might have simply stated that
there was also a lack of evidence to support this contention, but they
proceeded to equate the term "accidental" with the clause "accidental
means," stating, in effect, that to be accidental, there must be acci-
dental means. The policy in this case insured against "accidental
bodily injury" and not against injury by "accidental means." With
the technical meaning attached to the clause "accidental means" by
the strict view, the incorporation of that clause into the concept of
"accidental" seems to be an over-extension of the strict view. This
29. Id. at 271, 43 N.E.2d at 231.
30. Id. at 272, 43 N.E.2d at 232 (dissent).
31. 134 Ohio St. 222, 16 N.E.2d 316 (1938).
32. 84 Ohio App. 202, 82 N.E.2d 765 (1948).
33. 69 Ohio L. Abs. 78 (C.P. 1952), 4f'd, 160 Ohio St. 355, 116 NE.2d 204 (1953).
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incorporation has no authority in prior Ohio cases. All the previous
Ohio courts that have rendered decisions in this area were confronted
with the clause "accidental means," and not merely the clause "acci-
dental injury." On appeal the supreme court affirmed, with two
judges concurring on the ground that there was no evidence of a slip,
fall, or any accident at the time the claimed injury was alleged to have
happened. 4 At least two former decisions by the supreme court had
recognized that there could be an accidental injury with no accidental
means, but had denied recovery because the policy provided for in-
demnity for injuries by accidental means.35 In spite of this, it would
seem that the Groves case is some authority that in Ohio there is no
distinction between "accidental injury" and "accidental means."
Whether this will evolve into "the law" is a matter only time can re-
solve.
It may be said with assurance, though, that in Ohio, the clause
"accidental means" is strictly construed, and the liberal approach has
found no favor in Ohio courts. However, there is at least one en-
couraging sign. A presumption is permitted in favor of the plaintiff
that the injury or death was caused by accidental means if there is
proof of violent and externally caused injuries." This presumption
establishes a prima facie case for the plaintiff and the burden of go-
ing forward then shifts to the defendant.3 7  If the defendant can
show that the injuries were occasioned by a voluntary act of the in-
sured, the presumption has then been overcome. This presumption
is the only inroad the liberal view has made in Ohio law. That there
will be any further gain is doubtful in view of the decision in the
Groves case, which seems to have extended, rather than contracted,
the strict view.
There remains for analysis a group of cases where Ohio courts
have permitted recovery even though a voluntary act of the insured
was involved. These cases cannot be classified as triumphs for the
liberal view since they expressly approve of the strict view as set
down in the New Amsterdam case, but distinguish that case and its
adherents.
In Hammer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 8
insured died as the result of heat prostration while roofing a house.
The insurance company contended that the insured voluntarily ex-
posed himself to the rays of the sun and, therefore, death was not
caused by accidental means. The court held that the death was
caused by accidental means. Note that this holding is exactly the op-
34. Ibid.
35. Mitchell v. New York Ins. Co., 136 Ohio St. 551, 27 N.E.2d 243 (1940); Burns v. Em-
ployers' Liability Assur. Co., 134 Ohio St. 222, 16 N.E.2d 316 (1938) (dictum).
36. Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949); Hassay
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 266, 43 N.E.2d 229 (1942).
37. Hassay v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 266, 43 N.E.2d 229 (1942).
38. 158 Ohio St. 394, 109 N.E.2d 649 (1952).
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posite of that rendered by the United States Supreme Court in the
Landress case discussed previously. In Commonwealth Casualty
Company v. Wheeler 9 insured froze to death while walking home
from work. The court held this was death by accidental means.
Both of these cases made the following distinction: the previous de-
cisions on accidental means may be distinguished because the means
was self-administered, and the acts were accomplished voluntarily and
in the manner intended. In the Hammer case the syllabus of the
court reads in part: "to warrant a recovery it is not necessary that the
exposure to the sun be an accident."40 This statement is difficult to
reconcile with the well-settled view in Ohio. In the Wheeler case the
court stated: "His exposure to the cold may have been voluntary, but
the result was wholly unexpected and did not follow as the usual ef-
fect of a known cause. It was not the natural and probable conse-
quence."41 Compare that statement with one found in the Mitchell
case:
It is true that the result produced was not that which was intended
and hence accidental. However, the fact that the result was accidental
does not make the means, which produce such result, likewise acci-
dental.42
The statement in the Wheeler case is contrary to the settled view in
Ohio, since it turns upon the result rather than the means. Notice
that if the Wheeler concept of accidental means were adopted, then
in all the cases discussed in this article, recovery would have been per-
mitted. The Hammer and Wheeler cases apparently represent ex-
ceptions to the normally strict approach. Similar results have been
reached in cases which involve taking an overdose of medicine,43
and drowning.44 While these results are undoubtedly in line with the
majority view throughout the country in this area of the law, they
are certainly not the normal Ohio view.
Thus, it becomes apparent that some confusion exists in Ohio as
to what constitutes injury by accidental means. It might be suspected
that in these latter cases it was felt that a contra result would be
carrying the strict view to absurd extremes. At any rate, they add
confusion to an already abstruse area of the law. The prophecy of
Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Landress case that "the attempted dis-
tinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge
39. 13 Ohio App. 140 (1919).
40. Hammer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 158 Ohio St. 394, 109 N.E.2d 649
(1952).
41. Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Wheeler, 13 Ohio App. 140, 153 (1919).
42. Mitchell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 136 Ohio St. 551, 553, 27 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1940).
43. Batchelor v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 53 Ohio St. 663, 44 N.E. 1130 (1895)(Mem.).
44. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Hubbell, 56 Ohio St. 516, 47 N.E. 544 (1897).
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this branch of law into a Serbonian Bog,"'45 is becoming a reality in
Ohio law today.
CONCLUSION
The realities of the situation speak strongly against the Ohio po-
sition. The problem seems to stem from an outmoded interpretation
of the relationship of the parties to the policy. This relationship was
cogently described in Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society:
Insurance policies, while in the nature of written contracts are not
prepared after negotiation between the parties, to embrace the terms at
which the parties have arrived in their negotiations. They are prepared
beforehand by the insurer.... Normally the details and provisions of
the policy are not discussed, except that the particular form of the policy
is best suited to give the applicant the protection he seeks. If he reads
the policy he is generally not in a position to understand its details and
meaning.. . . He seldom sees the policy until it has been issued and
delivered to him.... Many of its terms and all of its defenses and super-
refinements he has never heard of and would not understand them if he
read them.46
From the foregoing it would seem that the interpretation of the
clause "accidental means" adopted by the Ohio courts is unrealistic
and inequitable. Insurance companies, as well as the courts, are to
blame for the "Serbonian Bog" condition of the law. The insurance
companies can adequately protect themselves by explaining to the
applicant the meaning of these chameleon-like words or by substitut-
ing clearer language to define their limits of liability.
In view of the respective positions of the parties and the normal
business practice of soliciting, completing, and issuing policies, the in-
surance contract should not be treated as an ordinary mercantile con-
tract. The nature of this relationship is either not appreciated, or is
ignored in Ohio. While it is true that the average man's view should
not govern the judiciary, his understanding of "accidental means"
should be given great weight in this area since he is paying money
for protection in the event of an accident.
The concept of the clause "accidental means" has plagued and
baffled the bench and the bar since the inception of that clause in
insurance policies. The clause is obviously ambiguous and should be
construed against the insurance company. It is submitted that the
distinction now present in Ohio should be abandoned or, in the al-
ternative, the liberal approach should be adopted. In either event a
more equitable and realistic approach to the problem can be taken.
It is these areas of the law, with their hairline distinctions and in-
equitable results, that cause the populace to view the legal profession
with something less than respect and affection.
WILLIAM J. TELZROW
45. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934).
46. 94 Utah 532, 561, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (1937) (concurring opinion).
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